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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930212-CA 
v. : 
CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from convictions for escape, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1990) 
and two counts of assault by a prisoner, third degree felonies, 
in violation Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court erroneously deny defendant's 
motion in limine to exclude evidence of his parolee status in 
violation of rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence? 
This issue has not been preserved for review. "Utah 
Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires xa clear and definite objection' 
at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal." State v. 
Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 
(1989) . To preserve a particular objection to evidence for 
appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated to the trial 
court the same grounds for objection presented on appeal. State 
v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 689 
P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). 
B. Did the court abuse its discretion in admitting 
evidence of defendant's parolee status over his rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, objection? 
A trial court has broad discretion to decide whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded under rule 403. See State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). A trial court does not 
commit reversible error in a 4 03 ruling unless it abuses its 
discretion; that is, "as a matter of law, the trial court's 
decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also State v. 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah App.), cert, denied, P.2d 
(Utah July 6, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with escape, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1990) and 
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two counts of assault by a prisoner, third degree felonies in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990) (R. 16-18). 
Following a two-day jury trial defendant was convicted 
as charged (R. 104-06) . 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a six-month term 
in the Salt Lake County Jail for the misdemeanor count and two 
terms of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for the 
felony counts, all terms to run concurrently (R. 142-44). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Motion in Limine 
Defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the trial 
court to "exclude any evidence revealing [his] parolee status or 
prior criminal history," on the grounds that the evidence was 
more prejudicial than probative under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 28-29) (attached as addendum A). Specifically, 
defendant requested that "no testimony be allowed to be 
introduced by the State regarding specific conditions of [his] 
parole status, i.e. that alcohol consumption constitutes a parole 
violation [.]" (R. 29), see Addendum A. Additionally, defendant 
asked that officers from Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) and 
from the Orange Street Correctional Facility be referred to only 
as "law enforcement officers" (R. 28-29), see Addendum A. 
Defendant further requested that the Orange Street Correctional 
Facility be referred to only as a "custodial facility" (R. 28), 
see Addendum A. Finally, defendant requested that a videotape 
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made of his conduct while at Orange Street be excluded (R. 29), 
see Addendum A.1 
The parties stipulated that 1) defendant was on parole 
at the time of his arrest; 2) he was arrested by AP&P agents; 3) 
the assault occurred outside the Orange Street Correctional 
Facility; and 4) the assault occurred while the officers were 
engaged in the performance of their official duties (R. 168). 
The parties further stipulated that while the fact of defendant's 
drinking would be introduced, the fact that his drinking also 
constituted a parole violation would not be introduced (R. 193-
94) . 
In ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court 
viewed defendant's requests concerning his parolee status as 
resolved by the parties' stipulation to exclude the fact that 
defendant's drinking constituted a parole violation (R. 199) (a 
complete copy of the trial court's oral ruling is attached as 
Addendum B). The court then granted that part of defendant's 
motion requesting that the involved AP&P and correctional 
officers be referred to only as law enforcement or peace officers 
(R. 198), see Addendum B. The court also granted defendant's 
request that the Orange Street Correctional Facility be referred 
to only as a custodial facility (R. 198), see Addendum B. 
1
 During oral argument on the matter, defense counsel 
also asserted that the evidence was not relevant under rule 4 01, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and cursorily argued that the evidence 
was not admissible under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 
180). Additionally, defense counsel argued that the videotape 
should be excluded under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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However, the court denied defendant's request to exclude the 
videotape (R. 197-98), see Addendum B. 
In response to defense counsel's request for 
clarification of its ruling concerning the admissibility of 
defendant's parolee status, the court explained that based solely 
on the parties' stipulation, only the fact that defendant's 
drinking constituted a parole violation would be excluded: "I 
granted that because it was the subject of a stipulation, I'm 
not sure that would have been my ruling" (R. 204), see Addendum 
B. The court further explained that other indicia of defendant's 
parolee status was not at issue because it had not been 
specifically listed in the motion in limine (R. 199), see 
Addendum B. Thus, the court ruled: 
[D]efendant's parole status is a subject that 
is relevant, and further, a subject that is 
probative, and more probative than 
prejudicial. 
You have a person who is a prisoner, and you 
charge that person with assault by a 
prisoner. The prisoner's status is a key 
element. In this case [defendant] is not 
charged precisely with that, but the 
underlying facts and circumstances are at 
issue. He is a prisoner, and how he happens 
to be prisoner is a matter of relevance. 
[Defendant's] lawful arrest is predicated in 
part upon the fact that he was a parolee, and 
that's my finding. There would have been no 
other basis for arresting him. The basis of 
the arrest, as I understand it, . . . had to 
do with his parole status. 
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There is no way around that. It is the fact. 
And so, given the nature of the charges, the 
totality of the facts and circumstances, 
while it may be in some slight way 
prejudicial, it certainly is probative of the 
crime charged before the court. 
(R. 204-06), see Addendum B. 
B. Motion for Mistrial 
During jury selection, a potential juror (who was later 
struck for cause) commented that he knew defendant, stating: "I 
have worked a lot with the alcoholics and the people coming out 
of jail" (Transcript of Jury Trial, February 16-17, 1993, T. 54) . 
Defendant subsequently moved for a mistrial on the apparent 
ground that other potential jurors overheard the comment (T. 78). 
The trial court denied the motion, ruling as follows: 
The fact that the defendant is a person 
who has parole status is also something that 
is clear and was not to be the subject of any 
kind of limitation. Additionally, the fact 
that he is a person convicted is something 
that is going to come out. 
The nature of the allegations before 
the Court, the fact that he was a person 
under arrest, a person assaulting a peace 
officer, is not a matter that is secret. If 
this were a case in which the defendant were 
not a person who, by virtue of the 
allegations, had a status that was related to 
incarceration in some way, then I would be 
inclined to look more seriously at the motion 
for a mistrial. 
But given the nature of the allegations, 
the brief references by prospective juror 
number four, the unclear nature of those 
references vis-a-vis the defendant, and the 
fact that they are not particularly 
prejudicial in any respect, I am going to 
deny the motion for a mistrial. 
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(T. 82) (a complete copy of defense counsel's motion and the 
court's ruling is attached as Addendum C). 
C. Jury Trial 
A two day jury trial was held on February 16-17, 1993 
wherein the following evidence was adduced. 
On the evening of September 4, 1992, AP&P Officers Brad 
Bassi and Swen Heinberg investigated the report of a domestic 
disturbance involving defendant and his wife (T. 107, 174). 
In the course of their investigation the officers smelled alcohol 
on defendant's breath and noted his agitated emotional state (T. 
113-14) . The officers believed the dispute could be resolved 
peacefully if they "remove[d]" defendant "from what was obviously 
a volatile situation [.]" (T. 175). After the officers tried 
unsuccessfully to contact defendant's relatives, they decided the 
next best course was to take defendant to a nearby custodial 
facility (T. 175-76). However, the facility refused to take 
defendant because he refused to comply with their regulations (T. 
176). Consequently, the officers arrested defendant for a parole 
violation and attempted to transport him to the Salt Lake County 
Jail (T. 136, 177). 
As defendant was being escorted from the custodial 
facility, he escaped to a nearby field (T. 177-78). Defendant 
was apprehended after a short chase and the officers again 
attempted to transport him to the county jail (T. 178). When the 
officers attempted to sit defendant in the rear passenger area of 
their vehicle, defendant laid on his back and began kicking 
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rapidly (T. 179). Officer Bassi estimated that defendant kicked 
him 2 0-30 times from a distance of approximately one to two feet 
(T. 126). Defendant also grabbed hold of Officer Bassi's right 
arm and "twisted" it behind his (Officer Bassi's) back (T. 124-
25, 181). Officer Heinberg estimated that defendant kicked him 
approximately two to three times (R. 180). Additionally, 
defendant spit at and attempted to bite Officer Heinberg (T. 124, 
179, 181). "[Defendant] was turning his head to the left and 
trying to bite. . . . [Officer Heinberg's] ear or his face, 
[and] snapping at him" (T. 124). 
At this point, the officers requested backup from the 
custodial facility (T. 181). Two officers responded and helped 
to subdue defendant (T. 182). Because the officers' vehicle did 
not have a protective cage, they called the Salt Lake City Police 
Department for further assistance in transporting defendant to 
the county jail (T. 83). 
Officer Victoria Allred responded in her "cage" car (T. 
244). Defendant was secured in the "cage" car with a seat belt, 
handcuffs, and a rope around his arms (T. 245). Officer Allred 
was forced to pull over twice on the way to the jail because 
defendant was "very verbally abusive and belligerent and 
thrashing about, kicking, pounding his head on the windows and 
the cage behind and making threats" (T. 245) . Defendant was also 
"getting out of his seatbelt" and the other restraints (T. 246). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's admission of defendant's parolee 
status was proper. Defendant did not preserve for appeal his 
impermissible character objection to the trial court's admission 
of his parolee status. Nor has he argued that there are 
"exceptional circumstances" justifying his waiver of the issue, 
or that this Court should consider his argument under the plain 
error doctrine. Further, the alleged improper references to 
defendant's parolee status, of which he complains on appeal, were 
initiated by defense counsel in his opening statement. Thus, 
error, if any, would constitute invited error. Finally, 
defendant fails to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to exclude the evidence under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PAROLEE STATUS WAS ADMISSIBLE 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously allowed 
evidence of his parolee status throughout the two-day jury trial, 
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Br. of App. at 3-4, 
5-6. Claiming his parolee status had no "'special relevance' to 
any of the charges against him[,]fl defendant asserts his parole 
status improperly, adversely reflected on his character. Br. of 
App. at 6. Further, defendant asserts the evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Br. of App. 
at 6-7. Insofar as it has been preserved for review, defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's evidentiary ruling lacks merit. 
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A. Waiver 
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires xa clear and 
definite objection" at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for 
appeal." State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). To preserve a particular objection 
to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated 
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on 
appeal. State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). Cf. State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991) ("Generally, a defendant who 
fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from 
asserting it initially on appeal."). 
1. Proceedings Below 
In moving to exclude his parolee status below, 
defendant's only articulated argument was his general assertion 
that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (R. 29, 180), see Addendum A. During oral 
argument, defense counsel also broadly asserted that defendant's 
parolee status was not relevant under rule 4 01, Utah Rules of 
Evidence and made cursory reference to rule 6 09, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 180).2 
The trial court denied defendant's request to exclude 
his parolee status, finding that defendant's "lawful arrest was 
2
 Although defense counsel additionally raised a rule 
404(b) challenge during oral argument, that challenge was focused 
exclusively on the admissibility of a videotape made of 
defendant's conduct while at the Orange Street facility (R. 186-
87). That videotape is not at issue on this appeal. 
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predicated in part upon the fact that he was a parolee" (R. 206) , 
see Addendum B. Thus, the court ruled defendant's parolee status 
was both relevant and probative (R. 204-405), see Addendum B. 
Although the court found defendant's parolee status admissible, 
the court granted defendant's motion requesting that defendant's 
parole agents be referred to solely as peace and/or law 
enforcement officers (R. 198), see Addendum B. The Court further 
granted defendant's motion that the Orange Street Correctional 
Facility be referred to solely as a "custodial facility" Id. 
During jury selection, a potential juror (who was later 
struck for cause) commented that he knew defendant, stating: "I 
have worked a lot with the alcoholics and the people coming out 
of jail" (T. 54). Defendant subsequently moved for a mistrial, 
on the apparent ground that the comment may have been overheard 
by other potential jurors (T. 78), see Addendum C. The court 
denied the motion, reiterating that defendant's "parole status 
[was] clear and was not to be the subject of any kind of 
limitation" (T. 82), see Addendum C. 
Notwithstanding the court's ruling granting defendant's 
request that his parole agents be referred to solely as law 
enforcement and/or peace officers, defense counsel referred to 
defendant's parole agents as "parole officers" in his opening 
statement to the jury (T. 103). Additionally, defense counsel 
variously referred to the officers as "parole agents," a "parole 
agent supervisor" and "agents" throughout the trial (T. 103, 111, 
135-36, 148, 222). When the State's witnesses subsequently made 
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reference to defendant's status as a "parolee[]," (T. 171), and 
"prisoner for AP&P," (T. 244), no objection was made. 
2• Failure to Preserve Impermissible 
Character Challenge 
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that 
the trial court's ruling admitting his parolee status violated 
rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Br. of App. at 5. Because 
defendant adequately raised only relevance and prejudice 
objections to the evidence below, his 404(b) challenge has not 
been properly preserved for review. See State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.) (general allegation of prejudice below 
held insufficient to preserve appellate argument that evidence 
should have been excluded as impermissible character evidence 
under rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). See also Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 34-35; Van 
Matre, 777 P.2d at 462; Davis, 689 P.2d at 14. The record does 
not indicate any reason for defendant's failure to so challenge 
the evidence in the trial court. Cf. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 
247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (absent special justification for 
failing to present all available grounds in support of a 
suppression motion, this Court will not rule on those grounds not 
addressed in the trial court). 
Moreover, defendant has not argued that there are 
"exceptional circumstances" justifying his waiver of the issue, 
or that this Court should consider his argument under the plain 
error doctrine. Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35; Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
at 925. Finally, the alleged improper references to defendant's 
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parolee status, of which he complains on appeal, were initiated 
by defense counsel in his opening statement and throughout the 
two day trial (T. 103, 111, 135-36, 141, 148, 222). Accordingly, 
any error was invited. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 
1993) ("a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at 
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error). The Court should deem defendant's rule 404(b) objection 
to the evidence waived. 
B. Defendant's Parolee Status Was Probative 
Defendant fails to show the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his rule 403 objection to the admission of 
his parolee status.3 A trial court has broad discretion to 
decide whether relevant evidence would be excluded under rule 
403. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). A trial 
court does not commit reversible error in a rule 403 ruling 
unless it abuses its discretion; that is, "as a matter of law, 
the trial court's decision that %the unfairly prejudicial 
potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its 
probativeness' was beyond the limits of reasonability." 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). See also State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, P.2d (Utah July 6, 1993). 
3
 Although defendant arguably articulated rule 401, and 
rule 609 objections to the admission of his parolee status below, 
he has not raised those challenges on appeal. Thus, the State's 
response is limited to addressing the admissibility of 
defendant's parolee status under rule 403. 
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Defendant makes no effort to demonstrate that the trial 
court acted unreasonably in not excluding evidence of his parolee 
status under rule 4 03. See Br. of App. at 6-7. Rather, the 
reasonableness of the ruling is manifest by the court's 
willingness to restrict the parties references to defendant's 
parole agents, and to the correctional facility, in order to 
dilute prejudicial effect.4 In short, the court's ruling was 
reasonable. Defendant was arrested for a parole violation (R. 
136). Accordingly, the court properly ruled that the basis of 
defendant's arrest was both relevant and probative to the charged 
offenses: escape and assault by a prisoner (R. 201-206), see 
Addendum B. Cf. State v. Lancaster. 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988) 
(permissible to introduce evidence of defendant's prior 
conviction in order to prove an element of the offense for which 
he was on trial); State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 ("[E]vidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is admissible where those 
other crimes are so linked with the crime charged in point of 
time and circumstances that one cannot be shown without proving 
the other."). 
4
 As noted in part (A)(1), infra, it was defense counsel 
who initially breached the court's ruling, referring to the 
officers variously as "parole officers," "parole agents," and a 
"parole agent supervisor" (R. 103, 135-36). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should 
uphold the trial court's ruling affirm defendant's convictions 
for escape and assault by a prisoner, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this >S day of November, 1993. A, 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
AN DECKEI 
sistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, attorney for 
appellant, 424 J3ast 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this S day of November, 1993. 
TfMtm $)z{M^ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
DAVID P. S. MACK, #4370 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION IN LIMINE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, : Case No.921901678FS 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, CALVIN BUTTERFIELD, by and through counsel of 
record, DAVID P. S. MACK, moves this Court for an order prohibiting 
the prosecution from introducing any evidence revealing Mr. 
Butterfield's parolee status or prior criminal history on Septeinber 
4, 1992, specifically: 
1. That Officers Bassi and Heimberg not be allowed to be 
identified by themselves or others by use of the terms I.S.P. 
agents, intensive supervised parole agents, Adult Parole and 
Probation agents, AP&P agents, probation officers/agents, parole 
officers/agents etc. but only as law enforcement officers; 
2. That Orange Street Community Correctional Center be 
referred to by the prosecution and any prosecution witnesses only as 
a ,fcustodial facility" and not as Orange Street C.C.C., Orange 
Street, half-way house, etc.; 
00028 
3. That Officers Cole and DeLand not be allowed to be 
identified by themselves or others by use of the terms Corrections 
Officers, Orange Street C.C.C. officers, etc. but only as law 
enforcement officers; 
4. That no testimony be allowed to be introduced by the . 
State regarding specific conditions of Mr. Butterfield's parole ^Jc^ 
status, i.e. that alcohol consumption constitutes a parole 
violation, etc.; 
5. That the video tape made at Orange Street C.C.C. on
 v 
September 4, 1992 depicting Mr. Butterfield not be allowed to be ^"-^-W^ 
referred to or introduced by the prosecution or any prosecution ;+\ L 
witnesses.
 r 
Defendant makes this motion on the grounds that the ^ / * ^ ^ ' 
evidence sought to be excluded is irrelevant and not probative of *UT~ 
the charges alleged in the information or, if relevant, is violative 
of Rule 403, U.R.E., in that any probative value is outweighed by 
prejudice to Mr. Butterfield. 
DATED this day of December, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
DAVID P. S. MACK 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this "M day of December, 1992. 
"fyW\A 
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ADDENDUM B 
1 Again, I think, you know, we can narrow this and 
2 put it in a vacuum and eliminate a lot of the extraneous 
3 stuff that I think is prejudicial and reversible, 
4 J possibly, and you know it's a very simple case. We're 
5 I talking about alleged assaults, here. They happened or 
6 they didn't. He was a prisoner or not, and they were 
7 I peace officers or not. And I don't know we need to go 
8 J beyond that. 
9 THE COURT: Let me ask you this, just to be 
10 I clear on the video tape issue. Are you suggesting at this 
11 point in time that if we utilize the entire video tape, 
12 which you believe to be less prejudicial, as I understand 
13 it, because it's contextual, that is to say the whole 
14 thing is put in context, are you saying that then you have 
15 no objection to its utilization? 
16 MR. MACK: Well, I would still prefer not to 
17 have it. I think it's cumulative, and I think it's not 
18 extremely relevant. I think that whatever went on there 
19 can be testified to by the witnesses he intends to call. 
2 0 If you're going to let any of it, I guess I 
21 I would reserve that and like to view it one more time, but 
22 I think I would rather have the whole thing shown than 
23 I just the part that best fits the prosecution's theory. 
24 I THE COURT: Let me say this. This is predicated 
25 upon your having another opportunity to look at it, this 
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1 is predicated upon testimony establishing that it was near 
2 I in time and closely related to the episode in question in 
3 J terms of geography and temporal proximity, and if I 
4 J assume, based upon that, that I'm going to let it in, I 
5 I want to be clear that one of the subjects of voir dire 
6 with this jury panel is going to have to be whether they 
7 be offended by seeing, albeit from a distance, you know, 
8 I part of a nude male body. Because I think that's an issue 
9 we need to deal with. 
10 Now, I'll be candid with you. The placement of 
11 the video camera, the placement of the police officers in 
12 relation to the defendant and the video camera, really, to 
13 my mind, removes any real sensational aspect, but I want 
14 to be clear that that's one of the things I think we need 
15 to be cognizant of. 
16 MR. MACK: With regard to if it's used— Well, 
17 so you're saying that maybe a voir dire question, and then 
18 I the decision to whether to view it or not will come later. 
19 THE COURT: I'm saying that at this point in 
2 0 time, if I allow the video, in response to your objection, 
21 it would be the total video, not just the last portion. 
22 But secondly, my perception is the video tape is relevant, 
23 I Secondly, I do not believe at this point in time, if the 
24 video is temporally proximate, and consistent, with what 
25 Mr. Updegrove has related by way of proffer, in relation 
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1 I to the event can be established, I'm inclined to let it 
2 in, finding that it is not unduly prejudicial, and that it 
3 I is probative. I do not find it cumulative of what I 
4 understand the evidence to be. 
5 So certainly you can renew your motion, and I 
6 J obviously am not going to make a final determination until 
7 I have heard the testimony that will precede its 
8 I admission. But that's the way I'm heading at this point 
9 in time. 
10 As to issue number 1, I'm going to rule that 
11 officers Bassey and Heinberg are to be referred to only as 
12 peace officers or law enforcement officers. Further, I'm 
13 going to order that, or rule, I should say, that the 
14 Orange Street Community Correctional Center be referred to 
15 as a custodial facility, so in that sense I'm granting the 
16 motion in limine as to 1 and 2. 
17 In large part, because of the ruling, as Mr. 
18 Mack has pointed out in connection with the motion to 
19 dismiss, that puts it in consistency, or conformity with 
20 the pleading and the information. 
21 And also, as to point 3, that officers Cole and 
22 DeLand be allowed to be identified by themselves or others 
23 by the use of the term "correctional officers," that 
24 I provision, they are to be referred to, again, as peace 
25 I officers or law enforcement officers. My understanding is 
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1 I that that is consistent with the information. Although 
2 not as specifically correct, I think it is less 
3 J prejudicial and fairer to the defendant, and still 
4 J provides the jury with the information they need in order 
5 J to make an informed determination. 
6 J Section 4 in the motion in limine, and section 
7 5, I have already discussed. 4 is essentially the subject 
8 of a stipulation, and 5, I believe I have fully covered on 
9 the record. 
10 MR. MACK: Just to clarify, then, Your Honor, in 
11 covering things that I didn't specifically outline. But 
12 other references that would indicate Mr. Butterfield's 
13 parolee status, specifically curfew, prerevocation 
14 hearing, any references like that, we would ask that those 
15 also b e — 
16 THE COURT: That's not specifically part of the 
17 I motion. The parolee's status, I don't see, as being part 
18 of the motion, and I have not yet addressed that. So 
19 let's talk about that. I am referring to the police 
2 0 officers' designation, or the correctional officers, and 
21 to Orange Street. And my rulings have been largely based 
22 upon the way the information has been couched, and also 
23 the fact that alluding to Orange Street as a community 
24 I correctional center does not seem to add anything, and may 
25 I be prejudicial. 
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1 But the issue of parole status, I'm not 
2 convinced that that is in the same, that that's the same 
3 issue. 
4 1 MR, MACK: Your Honor, I misunderstood, then, I 
5 thought you ruled to that part of number 4—I listed one 
6 example, there—which had to do with alcohol. But the 
7 main point there was anything regarding— Well, his 
8 I status as a parolee. 
9 J THE COURT: Well, 4 says no testimony be allowed 
10 to be introduced by the state regarding specific 
11 conditions of Mr. Butterfield's parole status, i.e. 
12 alcohol consumption. 
13 Let me ask you this, Mr. Updegrove. Do you 
14 intend to attempt to introduce any other aspects of his 
15 parole status? 
16 J MR. UPDEGROVE: No aspects of his parole status, 
17 Your Honor. I was going to ask the, whether it be called 
18 a law enforcement or peace officer, why they took him to 
19 the custodial facility, and it would be he was, they were 
20 charged with looking into this matter for a possible 
21 parole violation. I mean, how can I get around that? 
22 THE COURT: How can you get around it, Mr. Mack? 
23 J MR. MACK: Well, back to his theory where they 
24 J were trying to be the nice officers, that was a step short 
25 I of jail. They were taking him there to get the parties 
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1 separated from this domestic dispute. 
2 I THE COURT: Well, the bottom line, though, is 
3 I it's part of their basis for detaining him and taking him 
4 I into custody. Had he been a citizen on the street they 
5 I would not have treated him in this same manner. So it 
6 seems to me that it is clearly relevant, isn't it? 
7 MR. MACK: Well, if it is, it's, I think, 
8 prejudicial. I think we can— 
9 THE COURT: The facts are the facts, are they 
10 not? 
11 MR. MACK: But we can talk about it, he wasn't 
12 J there, he wasn't there because it's Orange Street. He was 
13 there because that's a place they could take him. They 
14 tried to make phone calls there. They weren't even going 
15 to leave him there. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I've ruled with you on the 
17 Orange Street aspect. Now what I understand us to be 
18 talking about is the term "parolee," is the utilization of 
19 the term "parolee." And I frankly, you tell me where I'm 
20 J wrong. I don't see how we can talk fairly about the facts 
21 of this case without alluding to that. He was a parolee, 
22 and that is one of the underlying precepts of the arrest, 
23 I or the detention. Is it not? 
24 MR. MACK: Well, according to the officers' 
25 first statement, he was arrested for public intoxication. 
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1 I They can take him, I assume that a peace officer could 
2 take him to any facility, any location, within reason. I 
3 don't know that his status as a parolee adds anything to 
4 J that. I mean it's true he is a parolee, but they were 
5 exploring other options. They might or might not arrest 
6 him at that point for those charges. They were maybe or 
7 J maybe not going to take him to jail. 
8 But I think if we're not calling Orange Street 
9 J by its name, I think it's the same reason for not calling 
10 attention to his parole status. 
11 The charges that he's facing— 
12 THE COURT: The distinction, as I see it, Mr. 
13 Mack—and excuse me for interrupting—is that he was not 
14 in the Orange Street facility as an inmate or a resident, 
15 as I understand it. 
16 MR. MACK: Right. 
17 J THE COURT: So in my opinion, to allow 
18 utilization of the term "correctional institution" in 
19 connection with Orange Street gives a significance to that 
2 0 institution in the context of these facts that's 
21 inaccurate. That's the reason that I am ruling in your 
22 J favor on that. I don't want in any way to provide facts 
23 to the jury that are inaccurate. 
24 I I think what we're all about here is making sure 
25 I that the defendant gets a fair trial. And to the extent 
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1 I that that is unfairly reflective of the facts, I want to 
2 I minimize the usage of that term. Mr. Updegrove? 
3 MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, Your Honor. As the case 
4 I comes out, the two agents, Bassey and Heinberg, took him 
5 to Orange Street, they were initially going to put him in 
6 I Orange Street for overnight to see if he'd calm down, 
7 sober up and that sort of thing. They did not want to 
8 take him to the jail and to the prison. And when he 
9 J started acting up, as you saw in the tape, Orange Street 
10 J refused to take him. And then they had to take him to 
11 J jail, and the assault happened on the way to jail. 
12 The average citizen's not taken to some facility 
13 to be put in overnight to sleep it off and go back out on 
14 the street. It's very relevant that they didn't want to 
15 send him to prison. 
16 THE COURT: Is there any case law, Mr. Mack, to 
17 support your position that the utilization of the term 
18 "parolee" in this context is reversible error? 
19 MR. MACK: I don't have any directly on point, 
2 0 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: It is the fact, is it not? And it 
22 I seems to be a relevant fact, in view of the totality of 
23 I facts and circumstances, as I see it. 
24 MR. MACK: Well, then why are we doing— You 
25 I granted part of number 4 regarding the fact that alcohol 
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consumption would constitute a parole violation. If he's 
on parole and that's a violation, why bring it in? 
THE COURT: I granted that because it was the 
subject of a stipulation. I'm not sure that would have 
been my ruling. 
MR. MACK: Well, I just think where there's a 
way to get through this without calling attention to his 
status, which is prejudicial, I think, in the whole 
case—and there's an easy way to do it. I don't think 
we're really putting one over on the jury—to say he was 
taken here, he was separated from the combative situation, 
here. He had been drinking, they were calling his 
brother. 
The assaults took place afterwards, outside. 
The way it's charged it doesn't matter if he was on parole 
or not. It doesn't require his parole status. 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter to the charging, 
but it matters to the underlying circumstances and the 
conduct of the officers and the conduct of the defendant. 
I will allow you to renew this if you feel that 
you have any new statutory or legal authority for your 
position, or if the facts come out in a way different than 
we all anticipate. 
At this time my ruling is that the defendant's 
parole status is a subject that is relevant, and further, 
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a subject that is probative, and more probative than 
prejudicial. In fact, that's based upon what I understand 
the facts to be at this time. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, if I may ask, does your 
ruling, do you feel, comport with 609 problems? I mean 
the question's going to be raised in the jury's mind, 
"What crime did he commit?" That wouldn't come in if he 
testified, unless and if the state could prove that. I 
think that's just giving that to them, which I think is a 
problem with 609. 
THE COURT: How do you get around the fact that 
the man is on parole, counsel? You don't— 
MR. MACK: You just don't mention it. 
THE COURT: I don't think that that is even 
feasible. You have a person who is a prisoner, and you 
charge that person with assault by a prisoner. The 
prisoner's status is a key element. In this case he is 
not charged precisely with that, but the underlying facts 
and circumstances are at issue. He is a prisoner, and how 
he happens to be a prisoner is a matter of relevance. 
Again, I am willing to listen to anything 
further you wish to provide to me in writing. You can 
argue it again prior to trial, the morning of trial. But 
at this point in time, unless there's something else, 
that's my ruling• 
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1 MR. MACK: If I could make one statement, Your 
2 J Honor. His prisoner status is based on his being in 
3 J custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest. 
4 J THE COURT: Right, and his lawful arrest is 
5 J predicated in part upon the fact that he was a parolee, 
6 and that's my finding. There would have been no other 
7 I basis for arresting him. The basis of the arrest, as I 
8 I understand it, Mr. Updegrove, had to do with his parole 
9 I status. 
10 MR. UPDEGROVE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: There is no way around that. It is 
12 the fact. And so, given the nature of the charges, the 
13 totality of the facts and circumstances, while it may be 
14 in some slight way prejudicial, it certainly is probative 
15 of the crime charged before the court. So if you can find 
16 anything supportive of your position in terms of statutory 
17 authority, which, frankly, would stun me, given the nature 
18 of the crime, I'd be happy to consider it. If the facts 
19 come out differently than we expect in terms of what 
2 0 motivated the officers, that I will also consider. You 
21 can certainly renew your motion. 
22 But at this point in time that's my ruling on 
23 J both the video tape issue and the issue of the parolee 
24 status. All right, thank you. We're in recess. 
25 I (Recess.) 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 0 0?06 
ADDENDUM C 
struck one, four, eleven, nineteen, and twenty-two. If 
there is nothing further, do you both pass the jury for 
cause in the condition it is presently in? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The State does, your Honor. 
MR. MACK: Tour Honor, I am a bit concerned 
about what Mr. Riley said in the presence of the 
other jurors. And I know that from our prior 
discussions of our submitted voir dire with respect to 
Mr. Butterfield's parole status I am not worried about 
that. But what he said, or what I wrote down that he 
said, was he's dealt with alcoholics and people coming 
out of jail. 
I don't know if that's -- I mean -- you have asked 
questions about alcohol use. I do not know if alcoholic 
is something stronger, that the rest of the jury might 
be really wondering now. Particularly in light of 
his — well, I don't think that there's any connection 
really between his now being released, but I know — 
THE COURT: What are you asking for, Mr. Mack? 
MR. MACK: I guess it would be a motion for 
mistrial based on that. 
THE COURT: Is that what you are asking for? 
MR. MACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are asking for a mistrial? 
MR. MACK: Yes, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Seriously asking for a mistrial? 
Tou want to start from square one? 
MR. MACK: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tou believe that those comments 
have prejudiced your client? 
MR. MACK: I don't know. I think — 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Tour Honor, I don't think that 
is a test of prejudicing the jury. We have already — 
the jury has to — jury panel has to know by now that he 
is a parolee, we're involved with a parole situation, 
that he's been in some type of incarceration. From the 
questions concerning whether they drink, they have got 
to have a feeling in their mind that Mr. Butterfield 
drinks and there's probably something to do with the 
assault -- or the charges to do with alcohol. 
I don't see that just the term I have worked with 
alcoholics — he didn't say I worked with alcoholics 
like Mr. Butterfield or I worked with that alcoholic. I 
just don't think that the panel has been quite 
prejudiced. 
THE COURT: Are you able to go back to that 
portion of the voir dire where that prospective juror, 
Mr. Riley, addressed the issue of his acquaintance or 
potential acquaintance? 
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(Whereupon, the conversation was read back as 
follows: 
"MR. RILEY: First could I ask a question? 
I think I know this fellow." 
•THE COURT: Know what fellow?" 
"MR. RILE7: Right here. Do I know you 
Mr. — " 
"THE COURT: Are you referring, sir, to 
another juror?" 
"MR. RILET: The fellow that's here in the 
courtroom, that's on trial." 
"THE COURT: I see. You believe you are 
acquainted with the defendant, Mr. 
Butterfield?" 
"MR. RILET: I have worked a lot with the 
alcoholics and the people coming out of 
jail." 
"THE COURT: All right, just a moment sir. 
I am going to ask that you listen to me. 
Do you believe you are acquainted with the 
defendant?" 
"MR. RILET: I think I ran across him.") 
(End of read back.) 
THE COURT: It will be my ruling that I do not 
believe that in any way has this jury been impacted by 
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the few quick brief comments that prospective juror 
number four made. I am frankly surprised that a motion 
for mistrial has been made, especially in view of the 
fact that you did not even want Mr. Riley excused for 
cause, counsel. 
But I will indicate that in reviewing the record 
with the court reporter, the only comments that were 
made were: I think I may know this fellow on trial. 
I've worked with a lot of people, alcoholics and people 
coming out of jail. 
He does not specifically say that he knows the 
defendant to be either an alcoholic or a person coming 
out of jail. We did not excuse him at that time point. 
He will be excused for cause, but the rest of all of the 
other challenges -- so he will not be set apart for the 
rest of the jurors to understand that there may be some 
particular acquaintance with the defendant. 
In addition, this is the case where I was asked by 
the defense, and based upon the defendant's request did 
make inquiry of the jury as to whether or not they 
consume alcohol and as to whether they could be fair to 
a person who consumes alcohol. So the issue of alcohol 
has already been brought to the attention of the jurors 
by virtue of the defendant's voir dire question, which I 
asked in response to defendant's request. 
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The fact that the defendant Is a person who has 
parole status Is also something that Is clear and was 
not to be the subject of any kind of limitation. 
Additionally, the fact that he Is a person convicted Is 
something that is going to come out. 
The nature of the allegations before the Court, the 
fact that he was a person under arrest, a person 
assaulting a peace officer, Is not a matter that is 
secret. If this were a case in which the defendant were 
charged with D.U.I, or the defendant were not a person 
who, by virtue of the allegations, had a status that was 
related to incarceration in some way, then I would be 
inclined to look more seriously at the motion for a 
mistrial. 
But given the nature of the allegations, the brief 
references by prospective juror number four, the unclear 
nature of those references vis-a-vis the defendant, and 
the fact that they are not particularly prejudicial in 
any respect, I am going to deny the motion for a 
mistrial. Is there anything further at this point, 
Mr • Updegrove ? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Mack? 
MR. MACK: No, your Honor. 
(End of conference in chambers.) 
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